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IN THE SUPREt:E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U':i\li 
THEODORE J, HODGES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Supreme Court no. 19248 
vs. 
WESTERN PILING & SHEET 
COMPANY, STATE INSURANCE 
FUND and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a review of a final order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah that awarded appellant benefits under Utah's 
worker compensation laws. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
The Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's Supplemental Order, which reversed a previous 
order awarding permanent total disability benefits to appellant. 
The Supplemental Order also reduced appellant's weekly benefits 
from those awarded in the previous order after a recalculation 
of appellant's weekly wages at the time of his industrial accident. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent's request that the Utah Supreme Court reaffirm 
the final order of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
weL::er 
yeci rs. 
Appe~lant, Theodore J. lloclges, nci,i been ci ['1le ,;ult 
for ·;ester:i Piling & Sheet 
( R, 23) On February 23, 
Company fot ::;one e10ht to 
1981, he was inJured on 
tr:n 
tl1c' 
joo when a length of heavy pipe he was helpiny to locid struc'.-. 
him in the right upper arm. (R, 1,2,11,13,17,25-26) 
Mr. Hodges was 68 at the time of the accident. He 
had begun receiving Social Security retirement benefits at age 
65, but he had continued to work off and on for Western Piling. 
At the time of his accident in February, 1981, Hodges was working 
approximately 40 hours per week. (R, 17,24) But he was aware 
that his Social Security benefits might be reduced if he ea med 
over a certain amount per annum. (R, 42) 
Mr. Hodges consulted his chiropractor, Dr. Bruce Egbert, 
the day after the accident. After one or two visits for "adjustments" 
to his back and shoulders, Hodges was referred to Gordon R. Kimball, 
M.D. (R. 2, 13, 30-31) 
Dr. Kimball first saw Mr. Hodges on March 2, 1981. 
he diagnosed Hodges' injury as " .•• a severe contusion to tl1e 
right arm and shoulder with a partial tear of the bicep muscle; 
He also noted a large amount of swelling in Hodges' 
right arm and shoulder. (R, 11-12, 31, 76) In a letter, Dr. Kin1ball 
concluded that it was reasonable to give Mr. Hodges a permanent 
partial disability rating of 20% impairment to the whole arr1 
as of June 23, 1981. (R, 77) 
After the first one or two visits, Dr. Kimball treateJ 
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~.,1 r • Hod -JC-; wit 11 1 11 ; ' l t- "JI a1ne and cortisone. (R, 76, 78) 
~;' c) _! J L) ',/ l n j I:_; I : !t) [ i 1 .c.:- 'L::iJt-~, Jr. :<imball ;;aw Hodges 
dljL11n (Jn ._Tur1'~· 11, l' :1.: _:, '~111,J 'lo_1n~:.. ttien ::;eriou:;ly incapacitated 
,j [ t Ii r ,J l ( ,, '' 7•i' 7 3) i\ccorcling to :lr. flodc;es' 
ii i ci "e i g ht ' .. 'en c f r on 1 G 5 to 1 S 0 po u n J s • (RI 3 2) This condition 
was so severe that Dr. Kimball had Hodges admitted to the hospital 
on June 19, 1981, and arranged for consultation from Paul Miner, 
M.D. (R, 32-33, 76) 
Dr. Miner diagnosed this condition of Hodges as "probacle 
osteoarthritis" and treated Hodges with Mortrin. (R, 4) On 
or about June 20, 1981, Hodges was released from the hospital 
on a home program of local heat and medications. (R, 33) He 
was readmitted shortly thereafter for further evaluation of his 
joint complaints and fluid retention, under Dr. r1iner's super-
vision. (R, 4) 
Dr. Frank Dituri, M.D., a medical consultant hired 
by the State Insurance Fund, interviewed and examined t·!r. Hodges 
in the hospital sometime during his second stay in the later 
part of July, 1981. (R, 43-45, 64-65) Dr. Dituri's diagnosis 
was that Hodges' accident had caused "injury to the right upper 
extremity which produced an ecchymosis and a tear of the body 
of the biceps muscle." Dr Dituri concluded further that Hodges' 
flareur or osteoarthr it1s related to a pre-existing arthritic 
condition and could nQl "be attributed to the industrial injury 
of February, 1981," w.i;: "to so1"e allergy to cortisone that was 
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injected into [Hodges'] shoulders. " (R, 67) 
Dr. Miner continued seeltHJ "ll. .1u.__J .... _;c..:. .:=1 :__le· r !l l -l ]1CJ 1 ! l \cl l -
izations for about four ;;1onths. Dr. '1 L n c: r t II(> n l 't c· r_ r v ~; ,, 
patient to a Dr. Knibbe, an arthritis s~ecial1st. ( K, 34) 
Appellant Hodges timely file!J 111.:; claim for •,:ocl<cr'c; 
compensation benefits (R, 1,71) ancl Arpl1cat1on for He:Hiny (R, 
17). On March 11, 1982, a hearing was held before the Industrial 
Commission of Utah on Mr. Hodges' claims. Hodges was still under 
Dr. Knibbe's care as of the date of the hearing, but there are 
no reports from Dr. Knibbe in the record. (R, 33,45) 
Dr. Kimball again saw Mr. Hodges on March 1 7, 1982, 
and found that the arthritic condition had severly deteriorated. 
In reviewing the case, Dr. Kimball concluded, however, that "~ 
arthritis !wasl completely ynrelated to the indystrial injyry" 
and that the industrial injury to the right upper arm only "~ 
sitated !Hodges' l temporary total disability for a period of 
four months •••• " (R, 76-77) (Emphasis added) 
At the conclusion of the March 11 hearing, Boyd G. Holbrook, 
M.D., was appointed to head a medical panel to make an impartial 
evaluation of the case. (R, 62, 72-74) Dr. Holbrook's report 
concluded that, while Hodges was 100% impaired as a result of 
his arthritis alone, "the diffyse seyere arthritic oroblep had 
its onset sybsegyent to the accident of February 23. 1981 out 
was in no way related to those eyents." (R, 91) (Emphasis added) 
The report stated further, "It does not appear that the applicant 
was totally and permanently disabled at the tjme his indystrial 
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conJ1 t ic1n 11J:,_ ,,lcJ1LU us,_1 _1,_''!J.11o _;Li!De J3, 1981 (R, 91) 
The total u.'l'''u ment exc1ucling cue general12.ecl 
arthritis is lS 00 perr:1anent loss ot oody fu.<ction. 
26% perrnonent lo:;:; of body function pre-e;,isting. 
9% per~1anent loss of bocly function Jue to 
inJury to the right shoulder in this accident. 
( R, 91) 
Dr. Holbrook reaffirmed these percentages of impairment 
at a later hearing on August 5, 1982, ( R, 111) Dr. Holbrook 
also pointed out at the hearing that, according to best medical 
knowledge, Hodges' arthritic symµtons could not have been brought 
on either by his treatment or by the industrial inJury itself. 
(R, 113, 114-115) 
On August 24, 1982, the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services submitted a report concluding that Mr, Hodges was not 
a good candidate for rehabilitation in view of his age and physical 
impairment. (R, 99) 
After receipt of the reports fror:i Dr. Holbrook and 
the Division of Rehabilitation Services, the Administrative Law 
Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on 
September 22, 1982. The Administrative Law Judge found that 
Mr, Hodges' overall permanent physical impairment attributable 
to conditions exclusive of the gene1alized arthritis was 35%, 
and he found 12% loss c[ 1~0,Jy furict1on sµecifically attributable 
to the industrial inJury uecause of impairment to Hodges' right 
arm. (R, 101) However, the Administrative Law Judge also found: 
the applicant's impairment combined 
with er.1ployment proble~1s incident to .:i'J',, 
educ at i 0 n, and ex re r i enc e, c' r c -' IJ f [ 1 (";('flt 
to render the apµl1cant ~1ermanenti]' a11,l t,,(c, 
disaoleJ irres 1Jective of 3n'/ Cl>11. i lc'~.JL~t1n 
of l11s generalized attl1ri~i". (:,~''cl 
total disaoility benefits provided for un,lc1 liL1il lc.w. 
(Section 35-1-67 U.C.A.) 
( ~:, 1: ~I 
In due course, Western Piling & Sheeting, the Second 
Injury Fund, and State Insurance Fund (defendants below, respondents 
here} filed a Motion for Review on October 7, 1982, and supportiny 
memorandum on January 27, 1983. (R, 105-106, 120-133) Ti1e ,\Jr:iin-
istrative Law Judge then issued a relatively lengthy Su,lpler1ental 
Order on February 24, 1983. In this order, the Adr,1inistrative 
Law Judge revised his earlier holding. He found that the effects 
of Hodges' industrial injury had stabilized as of June 23, 1981, 
and that Hodges "was not at that time so severely impaired as 
to be found permanently and totally disabled except as a result 
of the subsequently developing arthritis which was unrelated 
to the industrial injury ••• (R, 138) 
The Administrative Law Judge also adjusted Hodges' 
benefits after recomputing the wages he was earning at the time 
of the industrial accident. Since Mr. Hodges had been working 
only long enough each year to earn the maximuD of $5,500.00 allowed 
before his earnings would be offset against Social Security benefits, 
the Administrative Law Judge adopted the amount of $106. 00 ( $5, 500. 00 
divided by 52 weeks} as correctly representing Hodges' weekly 
earnings. (R, 138-139) The Administrative Law Judge thus reversed 
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t1 l~ e<..1r l 1er l i 11,J t n'J Ll1 , • J'- ~~'nH1ys were $624.00 per week . 
(R, lll2, lJH) 
0 n F' e o ' u" ' 1 ~ ;i , 1 ~ 8 3 , a pp e 11 ant Hodges submitted an 
ObJection to Supple:,1ental Order and Motion to Reconsider. (R, 
142-147) The Second Injury fund suomitted a Request for Amended 
Supplemental Order on ~arch 9, 1983. (R, 148-149) 
On 11ay 17, 1983, the Industrial Commission of Utah 
issued a Partial Granting of Motion for Review and AmenJed Order, 
in which it amended the Supplec1ental Order of February 23, 1983, 
in accordance with the Request of Second Injury Fund and reaffirmed 
the remainder of the Supplemental Order. (R, 152-154) 
Appellant Hodges submitted a Petition for Writ of Review 
to the Utah Supreme Court on June 8, 1983. (R, 155-159) This 
was granted, and Peitioner's Brief was submitted February 8, 
1984. 
Respondents now submit their brief in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S WEEKLY COtlPENSATION BENEFIT 
RATE \'/AS CORRECTLY CALCULATED IN THE 
FINAL ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
BECAUSE OF PETITIONER'S TESTIMONY THAT HE 
ONLY INTEtlDED TO EARN THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE 
BEPORE SOCIAL SECURITY OFFSETS. 
Under the first point in his brief, counsel for appellant 
claims that the Industrial Commission was mistaken when it assumed 
that Hodges could earn only up to $5,500.00 per year before suffering 
an offset against his Social Security benefits. Counsel bases 
his claim on the fact that Social Security law states that after 
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age 70, there is no offset against Wilges earneJ. (Appel L.in\' 
Brief, G-7) 
Res;;ondents ilre at a loss to :::;ee ti1e relevance of th1 s 
line of argunent. Mr. Hodges was 68 at the time of the ilCCiJent. 
Social Security law does, indeed, provide in part: 
an individual's excess earnings for 
a taxable year shall be .•• , except that, 
in determining an individual's excess earnings 
for the taxable year in which he attains 
age 70, there shall be excluded any earnings 
of such individual for the month in which 
he obtains such age and any subsequent month 
42 u.s.c. Section 403 (f) (3). 
But the relevant Utah l'/orker 's Compensation Law provides in pertinent 
part: 
••• the average wage of the injured employee 
at the time of the iniury shall be taken 
as the basis upon which to compute the weekly 
compensation rate. • • (Emphasis added) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-75(1), (1953 as amended). 
The issue before the Commission, therefore, was to 
determine Mr. Hodges average earnings at the time of his accident. 
What Hodges might be allowed by Social Security to earn per year 
at age 70 is irrelevant. This argument by appellant's counsel 
is a red herring. 
The best evidence in this case supports the findings 
of the Administrative Law Judge in his Supplemental Order and 
the Commission in its final order. At the time of his accident, 
Mr. Hodges had been working and intended to continue workiny 
for Western Piling only intermittently • working each year 
only until he reached the earnings limit allowed by Social Security. 
Counsel for appellant says that it is "sheer speculation" to 
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cone l ude t 1.1c:i l l_tJ I earned only $5,500.00 out for 
Ill.· 111JUty. { f\ Pl 1 e 1 1 1) But Hodges told Dr. Dituri 
wor:<ing JUSt enouqh to earn the maximur:i allowed under Social 
Security. ( R. 6 5) llodCJes testified similarly at tne hearing 
in this matter on March 11, 1982: 
Q. Are you on Social Security? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you been on Social Security? 
A. Oh. I was off on a disaoility with my knee, 
and I don't even know how long I was off. 
Then I decided I was going to take a stab 
at it, and go back to work. The Social 
Security told me that I had a period of nine 
man ths that I could go back and try, and 
see if I could do the work. That was prior 
to being 65. 
Q. I see. 
A. So I went back to work. I took pain pills, 
and went to work for approximately two 
years probably for Western Sheeting & Piling. 
Then I decided to give it up after I was 
65, and I went back on Social Security. 
Q. On a normal retirement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now since you have been on Social Security, 
you have continued to work? Is that correct? 
A. tvell, you' re entitled to work--wellr like 
this year I can make $5,500.00 and stay on 
Social Security. 
Q. so you wotked JUSt enough to --
A. I try to keep working, to keep in shape. 
Because if you lay around, you're not going 
to be worth a shit. So I try to keep working. 
I was in good shape, and I tried to keep 
9 
working. 
aoout ;1hat it 
coulJ u:.;c 
.J.~ounteJ to. 
t tlP l"'.l<)npy. 
(fl. 4 1-·\ >) 
Th e r e a 1 l s s u e :J e f o L e t h i s C u u r t l ~' l, l) \V a t) p e ~ l Jn t • ~ 
weekly cor.ipensation rate snoulJ oe ca 1 culateJ, yiven the f2c:l 
that he intended to earn only uµ to SS,500.00 ;:>er year. Utan 
Code Ann. Section 35-1-75(1) provides a nur.iber of ways to compute 
the weekly compensation rate, depending on how the employees 
wages are fixed. (See appendix I attached herec0; !\ope of the 
subsections, however, precisely fits appellant Hodges' situation. 
Section 35-1-75(3) provides: 
If none of the r.iethods in subsection (1) 
will fairly determine the average weekly 
wage in a particular case, the Commission 
shall use such other method as well, based 
on the facts presented, lli.l:J...y determine 
the employee's ayerage weekly wage. (Emphasis 
added) 
Pursuant to this subsection [the Administrative La11 
Judge mistakenly cites subsection (4)], the Administrative Law 
Judge calculated Hodges benefits based on his intended maxinm1 
earnings of $5,500.00. The Administrative Law Judge reasoneJ 
as follows: 
• it is extremely difficult to Justify 
an award of compensation for permanent partial 
impairment based upon the state maximum because 
52 weeks of benefits paid at the rate of 
$15 3. 00 per week would result in the payment 
of $7,956.00 which is nearly $1,500.00 nore 
than the applicant would have earned had 
he continued working and the accident had 
never occurred. Consequently, it seens only 
fair and reasonable to apply the provisions 
of subparagraph 4 of Section 35-1-75 in deter-
mining the applicant's rate of compensation 
for permanent partial impairment and limiting 
such payments to the income lost thereby 
or $106.00 per week ($5,500.00 divided by 
10 
Jc l 
f\ 1 Jr~n1strut1 Jc Lc.i··~,' ~Jd·::c 
!c, 118-J 39) 
,,,, jU iJ1ny pr inci;:al for the 
cy; i"'o,;qt100 for actual ipcope that 
would hqye oeeo egroeJ put fGr the accident. Io the Supplemental 
~r~Jer, ti1e t\Jr:,1n1..-;trat1ve Law Judge state:;, "It mu:;t be ever 
::>orne in rn1nJ tnat the ::iasic tneory of workmen's cor:ipensation 
is not damages but replacement of lost rncone." (R, 138) 
Counsel for appellant cites a number of cases to support 
his contention that an inJUred employee's weekly wages should 
oe assuned to have continued rnJefinately but for the injury. 
(Appellant's Brief, 7-8) 
The first case cited, Millard County y. Industrial 
Comr;n;;sion, Utah, 217 P. 974 (1923), sirnrly holds that earnings 
during employments prey1oys to an industrial acc:dent are irrelevant 
for purposes of computing benefits. ~1llard Countv provides 
no guidance for the present case, since the issue here is whether 
intended ~ "leaves of aosence" are to be taken into account. 
Morrison-Merrill & Company y. Indystrial Commission 
of Utah, 81 Utah 363, 18 P.2d 295 11933), and Park Utah Consol. 
1ines Company y. Indystr1al Commission of Utah, 84 Utah 481, 
36 P. 2d 979 (1934), are cited for tne proposition that the statute 
presumes that an inJured er;if.Oloyee's weekly wages would have continued 
indefinite\'/ c>ul C~t cric ''J'H 1 • "h.1s is true as a general rule, 
out 1 t 1 s on i 1 • t-c~u.,;::100; iinJ evidence in the case at bar 
sin1ply refutes the presumption that Hodges' wages would have 
continued indef1n1tely throughout the year but for his injury. 
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Reg a rd in g the evidence i n t n e i n c; t an t c a~ e , i t ;11 ci · 
oe noted that Park Utah Con;,;ol. :·lines Co111">Hl'/ C<),; I 1r111:;: 
In the determinin0 of fact:.=, t1:c c<1nLi',1_, l l,11 .. 
of the Co r.1 miss ion a r <= 1 i f; t> t n e v c· r ,J: c t o t 
a jury, and will not oe interfered w1tl1 oy 
this court when supported oy some suostant1al 
evidence. 36 P.2d at 982. 
Contemporary Utah cases are to the same effect. Entw.stle Co. y. 
Wilkins, Utah, 626 P.2d 495 (1981). 
~ Utah, 604, P.2d 937 (1979). 
C 1 a r k y • Inter state [1 o mes , 
[The Supreme) Court's function in reviewing 
Commission findings of fact is a strictly 
limited one in which the question is not 
whether the court agrees with the Commission's 
finding or whether they are supported by 
the preponderance of evidence. Instead, 
the reviewing court's inquiry is whether 
the Commission's findings are "arbitrary 
or capricious", or "wholly without cause" 
Only then should the Commission's 
findings be displaced. Kaiser Steel Corp. y. 
Manfredi, Utah, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (1981). 
Furthermore, all three of the Utah cases cited by appel-
lant's counsel (Millard County, Morrisson-Merrill & Company, 
and Park Utah Consol. Mines CompanJ', supra,) have to do witil 
the construction of law that took effect in 1921 and was amended 
in 1933. The present law, Section 35-1-75, was enacted in 1971 
and repealed the laws of 1921, and of 1933, relating to the basis 
for computing average weekly wages. 
Counsel for appellant cites a Texas case whico held 
that a claimaint's intentionally limiting his earnings to protect 
his Social Security is not relevant for purposes of determ1n1ng 
claimant's wage rate under Texas law. Texas Emplover's Tnsurance 
Association y. C.A. McMahon, 509 S.H. 2d 665 (Texas, 1974). 
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'i'1JC c d. ~ c -J pc~ t \_j 11•;,(11 l -:11->~'C ! lanL Is position; but it concerns 
t J1C l n t ,_,. ,- lC l d r1 'Ju a l_J e about "an employee of 
the SJ,"r: '. _il 'l' Te;( ~1 -~ ··'tat u t c. 509 s. w. 2d at 668. The 
Utor: ~tc0 tute Jop::; '"'l u~;e such lan,juage at all; and, therefore, 
the Texas ca::;e cannot 2rovide guidance in the interpretation 
of the Utah statute. :lore importantly, Texas law, of course, 
is not Utah law; and the task before this Court rer.iains that 
of determining whether the Industrial Comr.iission used as the 
trier of fact a method that would " ..• fairly determine • the 
average weekly wage." Section 35-1-75(3) supra. Unless the Suprene 
Court finJs that the Commission was arbitrary and capricious 
and that its method has no reasonable foundation in the evidence, 
its decision on the compensation rate should be sustained. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 
OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS, 
BECAUSE APPELLANT BECAME TOTALLY DISABLED 
ONLY FROM A PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT AS A RESULT 
OF A NON-INDUSTRIAL ARTHRITIC CONDITION WHICH 
BECAME MUCH WORSE AFTER THE INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT BUT WAS NOT CAUSED, AGGRAVATED 
OR CONTRIBUTED TO BY THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
In Point II of appellant's brief, it is argued that 
Mr. Hodges is entitled to permanent total disability benefits 
based on 35% impairment. Respondents dispute the claim that 
Hodges is entitled to t.Q..t.ll disability benefits. Respondent's 
position is that tile effects of Mr. Hodges' industrial injury 
stabilizecJ as of ,lune 21, 1981, and that he was not then so impaired 
as to be found permanently and totally disabled, except as a 
result of the subsequently developing arthritis which was unrelated 
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to the industrial injury. 
The Administrative Law Judge agreed 1;itl1 te-i,JcmJcnt. 
and so found in his Supplemental OrJer. (R, 137-138) Tne AJmini-
strative Law Judge based his finding on the fact that both appellant:'s 
treating physician and the medical panel found the effects of 
the industrial injury to have stabilized by June 23, 1981. (R, 
138) Dr. Kimball thought a permanent partial rating of 20% impairment 
of the arm was reasonable. (R, 77) Dr. Holbrook's medical panel 
report maintained that, e:<cluding the arthritis, Hodges hucl 35':.> 
permanent partial ir,1pairment of the whole man, 26'0> of which ·c1us 
attributable to pre-e;(isting conditions and 9% of which wus clue 
to the injury to his right shoulder in the ind us trial accident. 
(R, 91) 
In Entwistle Co. y. \Ulkins, Utah, 626 P.2d 495 (1981), 
this Court stated: 
The extent and the duration of an employee's 
disability are questions of fact to be determined 
by the Conmission. We review the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Commission's 
findings, and when there is substantial evidence 
to support the facts as found by the Commission, 
its order will not be disturbed. 626 P.2d 
at 498; footnotes dropped. 
Respondents submit that there is more than "substantial 
evidence" in the i:ecord to support the findings of the Adninistrative 
Law Judge and the Industrial Commission that tlr. Hodges is not 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of the inclustr1ul 
accident. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should affirm the fina! 
order of the Commission in this regard. 
Contrary to appellant's position, there is no medical 
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c v + j e o c c l n ,, 1 1 ._ r , , ' ,, 1t r:oJ'J'"::.; '.1as µcrmanently and totally 
- I l ~ ~ I l '_I .__:: [ [ l 3. l l n j U L Y • Counsel's 
.J; u ·~ n '_ p , • l) .J ; e .'J I 3 ) ~ t;-' [ l ~, ~ :_ C :i 2_ 
C 0 ~110 l n e -::1 \-/ l t .i ri .: .::; c.hj e , '~ d :JC Ll ':. i 0 n and e ~~ i_) e r l C n C '2 , re n J e r h 1 IT. 
l\tJpellant 's counsel c1t2:; a sta.ter.1ent o~' t~ie ,~di7linistrat1ve La1,,,, 
Judc;e in his original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
OrJer. (Appellant's Brief 10) Io that statement, the Admio-
istrative Law JuJge cor,1bined Hodges 35% physical impairment witb 
his age, education and experience and found Hodges to be permanently 
and totally disaoled. (R, 101-102) Howevet, the l\d111inistrativ2 
Lau Judge reputiated that statement as a mistake in his Supplemental 
Order. ( R, 13 7) Io other words, the Administrative Law Judge 
decided the evidence showed that Hodges could have returned to 
work when the effects of his injury stabilized (on June 23, 1981) 
but for his arthritis, which was unrelated and increased in severity 
after the industrial injury but not as a result of the industrial 
injury. The Administrative Law Judge corrected his findings 
accordingly: 
The Administrative Law Judge believes and 
now finds that the [statement of medical 
panel] really had reference to the extent 
of the applicant's permanent physical impairment 
which the panel concluded would not have 
remoyed him .....i.J....Q.. the job market in and of 
l"Irnpairment" and ",11.;,iL>ility" are to be distinguished. Impairment 
refers to the per:;oo's pnysical limitations. Disability refers 
to the person's inability to engage in gainful ernployment--because 
of age, education and experience, as well as physical impairment. 
See: Northwest Carriers. Inc. y. Indµstrial Commission, Utah, 
639 P.2d 138 (1981), note 3 at 140. 
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~ and that the reason for his inab1l it/ 
to continue working was due to the dcvclo •0nt 
of the subsequent onset of his sev(·te 3L tr.r 1 r '"'. 
(R, 137) (Emphasis a<lJed) 
Appellant's counsel also cites tne re';Jntt uC t"'' J1·;,J.1on 
of Rehabilitation Services, which found Hocic;es "not G •jOO i c3n.l"J.:>Le 
for rehabilitation." (R, 99) It is clear fror:i tne reriort, .101:evr..:t, 
that the Division based its assessment of Mr. [lodges ror:iarlly 
on the 100% physical impairment caused by his arthritis. The 
Division did not undertake an assessment as to what Hodges' prospects 
for rehabilitation might have been apart from his arthritic condit-
ion. Therefore, the report of the Division of Rehaoilitation 
Services does not support appellant's position. In his Suppler"ental 
Order, the Administrative Law Judge explicitly makes note of 
the Division's report before concluding that Hodges was not perman-
ently and totally disabled as a result of his industrial injury. 
(R, 137) 
Finally, counsel for appellant urges that the present 
case is almost identical to Brundage v. IML Freight Inc., 622 
P.2d 790 (Utah, 1981), and that the Court should follow Brundage 
in the present case. Respondents contend that Brundage has no 
particular relevance to the present case. 
The cases are not comparable on the facts. In Brundaqe, 
the plaintiff claimed permanent total disability resulting in 
part from his industrial accident, as does appellant in the present 
case. But the evidence was much different in Brundage. The 
medical testimony was that the claimant could not stand or sit 
for any prolonged period of time, that he was restricted in benJing 
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1_111 L Lkt' l/1r: t-r(~:,(-"11.L c-J,_,(_ r Ci!C.: clairnant'3 condition 
o f p e r rn an en t c.: n ~J t ..._, t ,:..i I J i ~ <Ju i_ 1 i ~ .Ln ;::,, uodage resulted fr on a 
conb1oatioo of his 1odu~t1ial 1ojur~ anJ ~re-existing impairments--
not fror,1 a conb1nat1on of an industrial inJury ancl l...a.t.tl, unrelated 
arthritic symptoms. Further, no evidence was presented to refute 
plaintiff's claim of permanent and total impairment. By contrast, 
there is substantial evidence in the present case that Mr. Hodges 
would have been able to return to work, had he not subsequently 
developed arthritic symptoms. Both the medical pane 1 and Mr. Hodges' 
treating physician would have released Hodges to his ususal work, 
absent the arthritis. 
POINT I II 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DID NOT ACT 
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY AND DID CONSIDER 
THE EFFECT, IF ANY, THE APPELLANT'S ARTHRITIC 
CONDITION HAD IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE ISSUE 
OF PERJ.IANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AND APPROPRIATELY 
WEIGHED THE SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE PRESENTED. 
Under Point III of his brief, Counsel for the appellant 
argues that Mr. Hodges had an arthritic condition l2.U.fil_ to his 
accident and that this should have been considered in determining 
the amount of Mr. Hodges permanent partial disability. 
The answer to this is that Hodges prior arthritic condition 
~ considered. Medical evidence did sho11 that Mr. Hodges had 
an arthritic condition µr1or to the industrial accident, but 
the Administrative Law Judge did not find that this caused any 
impairment or disability. (R, 136-137) There is sufficient 
evidence in the re co rd to support th is finding, including Mr. Hodges' 
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own testimony that he was in good pilyJic.:tl con Jition i't l<>t 
the accident (R, 34) LlnJ tl~e te.Jt1:-:;on/ o:_ :.: co-w'Ol !:t._:1 Llldl_ 1. lu•,J,)·--.:-· 
w a :3 phys i cu 11 y v er l' a c t i ·1 c o c f o L e t l1 e .) ...: -.: __ 1 ~' 11 L ( :-- , J 1 ) • F ~I i t 11 2 1 - , u r l , 
a. r t h r it i:; in ~.1 a '.<: 1 n J i ts a.:_; s cs::::;:--' c ;i t ..._,. ~ t- r c· v 1 o u:; i 1:1 pa l r ~11 c n t .3 • 
For e:ca~1ple, it staces: 
(4) The percentage of permanent physical 
impairment attributable to previously existing 
conditions has been identified fron the record 
as follows: 10% of the right upper extremity 
due to arthritis and other factors. • (R, 
91) (Emphasis added) 
Counsel for appellant also charges that the ~dministrative 
Law Judge was arbitrary in that, by changing his mind (in the 
Supplemental Order), the Administrative Law Judge denied appellant 
the opportunity to have additional hear in gs on the Ded ical panel 
report. Counsel complains that if he had known that Mr. Hodges' 
35% impairment would not have been deemed sufficient to render 
him totally disabled, counsel would have objected to the medical 
panel report concerning its view of Mr. Hodges' arthritic condition. 
All normal procedures were followed by the Comr.:ission. 
Under Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-77 (1953, as amended), a claimant 
has 15 days after distribution of the medical panel report in 
which to file objections with the Commission. It is incumbant 
upon counsel to bring forward all legitimate obJections at thal 
time -- not to sit back and second-guess the Administrative L.:H1 
Judge, waiting to bring forward objections at a later date only 
if necessary. If there was any question about any part of the 
medical panel report, then that question should have Deen raised. 
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TtH• t-ianr:-•l '::.; ,t c' :,( 111 ""' c • n: WJ ,;hat \'1JS causiny the continuing 
-' '''"~·''1" rn tr1e industrial accident was 
',-.:ir, thecn ti1e ::iurden was on the appellant 
"0: fl:1·;u1y ou1ectecl. the report becor:ies evidence to ObJeCt. 
fron wh1cn l J n _; 1 r, J can be base J • Thu:;;, the Administrative 
Law Judge 11d~ ce.: ta in Jy not arbitrary or capricious in issuing 
his Supplemental Order. 
CONCLUSIOtl 
The Suprer:ie Court should affirm the final order of 
the Utah Industrial Commission. Contrary to the arguments set 
forth in the appellant's brief, there are no grounds for reversal. 
First, the benefits for appellant were correctly calculated under 
Section 35-1-75 (3) in a way that ~ determined his average 
weekly wage. Second, the evidence in this case more than adequately 
supports the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Industrial Commission that appellant is entitled to disability 
benefits based on a finding of 35% impairment with appropriate 
apportionment between the State Insurance Fund and the Second 
Injury Fund as ordered, and is not entitled to permanent total 
disability benefits when the permanent total condition resulted 
from a subsequent condition not caused by, aggravated by, or 
related to the industrial injuries. It would have been reversible 
error to have found otherwise, given the evidence before the 
Commission. Third, appellants prior arthritic condition was 
considered by the medical panel and the Administrative Law Judge. 
The findings of the Industrial Commission were based 
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upon competent, substantial evidence and therefotc' lll'tr' n•>t cit.>:t r ,,1 
and capricious. This Court should sustain c.ic ln,Ju_;cc1 1 L 
Order. 
DATED THIS _2_Day of April, 1984. 
BLACK ~ :JOORF 
BY_r· . __ i_ld/ui[ ____ _ 
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I : I' ' .. I~" !l,i 1" <Jf c(1mputat1on. 1 l 1 
~ ( I 
,,:· 1 l,1' 1 nJu rt'd 
i'•r1\[1 • •, I \_' ~ ' 
th''' :1P' 'I ,1 ,j [1, t f,,.. .•o;q_-'.P 
·11 .. '1r'· r..: 'i"'t': 1:!, .\:11-'.r· b:, ri P r1umlJ1 r uf rla .. , ,u~d fr,1c-
,; .r:~ .' ;hl' t:P 'Jnil1·r a r11ntr,tct (Jf h1rl' .... a~ 
,r'-1r1h 11 ·~w '1r ':· ';,1_ c1lr11:en' .. f1r '.\•11J, :p ,\r1r~\"j 1f thP ,icr1dt>nt hJd r.r1t 
.nttn+•r,t·d In n11 •'d"•' -,n;1ll tt11· rJJ11y 1\Zii-'.l' tie rr.ult1plied by less than thrt'e t11r 
the puqJ 1 hP qf dd1,rrn1n 1 r.~ thf' '.\ ".J,.:r; 
((•J lf Jt the t1mr d tht \\;1ges ::trf' rixPd by the huur, the avera~(' 
\\ec'1dy ,.1, the huurl1· rate hv ~he number 
of huur') PmpJr,~;f'e 1'11•1ld have week 1( the acc1llPnt had n'it 
1ntrnf·nerl h n11 1;1"1· "h:1il •h1• Lnurl·, ,.1,,1gc hr n1ul 1 :ril1ed by IP55 than 20 f,Jr the 
purpn<;e r,f d1·tcrm1n1nl! thr• ,.,,., k:•, '.,q_:e 
1 [1 lf .it 'ht' \:111(· .,f thl' :hC' hr111rlv \\,1L.;r h:19 nrJt )1p1_·n f1xcrl or c:innot 
f1P ;i-,rrrt;11r.t·d, tfw '.\,J)..'.l' fr,r r!f ,·;11i'1il lttn)..'. COf1\)H'n'-J\1(\n ':!hall \1e the 
1h'J:..1i \cl,_;•· f1Jr 'i1rn1IJ.r <,('f\ICl':, t:-«no..: --,1•r'.1•·es ~Jrt: r1·nd1·r1·d h) pa,d ernpl11'.:-
l'P~ 
1g! {!1 If at thP t1nw (Jf the :nJur:; the ·.~age-; are h\ed by thP of the 
1·mplo:.t•e. •Ji,, a .. »r:i.i.;r• '.\t f·kly 1.\~1;.;:1' "h:i.11 be the '.\'3l!(' must ~u the 
"rn1Jl 1 i>•·t' rurnput1 .. J f,-, d1.,1d1ng by th1rt~'en the ',\at-;e~. nut 1nduJ1ng n"·t:r•_1mP qr 
~1ri-'m1um pc1:. 0f tl-w "rn;·'"':l·•' PJ.fnt'd t.hrough rh::it emp:uyt·r 1n the 1"1rst. -.,('1_rJ:1r!, 
thtrd. r.r fourth rJl'r1r"! 1Jf th1rtl'l'n con-,ecut1\e calenJar \\el'h.s in tne 5'2 '.\'t'l'ks 
.mnwd1;1tt·h rJrrc••1]1r11-'. i\.y lnjur:, 
1~1 1f tht· h,1'1 tJl'f'n !'ffi[1lr,-,1·d by that emrilrJ:,n le-;<; than thirteen ral-
~'nd....1r .,\,,.;._.,, rir1.·rt··l1r,g tc1· 1nJ11r: •. :;1s ,1.,er:11-'.t' ',\('1·kl." '.\,11-'.C '.-li.11! lie 
cnmputi>d ;i'l 11ndt•r "'J11-,t·r!1r,n 111 ll-'.1111. :1rt''>llm1nl-'. tht' ',\Jl-'.1'", not 1nc\uil1nL; O\l'r-
:1mt' Or i•r<'nllUnl jJ:t:,', ~fl J1e thC' .1111(0','"'.'. ~11' \UJUl<J h:\',\ l ,1rn1_· 1J f1:.td :ie i1;'Cn '-0 
empl(J:•''d for the full lhirtcen calcn1L1r "'-1'•'k" 1mmr·d1atcl::. pn·t1•d1ni.: the injury and 
had \\Orkcd, ... ht·n v,urk '""'J." av:.iilabit' to (1lh1..:r emriloyrl''), 1n J, '.:l1rnd.u occupation 
13) If none of '.ht> method9 1n subsection (I J wiil fairly determine the average 
weekly w.J.ge tn a rart1cular case, the commission shall use such other method as 
will. based on tr1e facts presented, fairly <ltterm1ne the employee's average weekly 
wage 
(·1) \\'hen th(' :l.~'Pf.)~(' weekly w:ige of the injured employee at the time or the 
inJUrJ 1.;; determ1nt:>d :v, 1n t~1'-i :'ection pro,·:derl. 1t shal! he taken as the basis upon 
'~hich lo cumputP UH' com~en'i<..1t1on rate After the weekly compensation 
has been computed, 1t shall rounded to ~he nearest dolla.r. 
ll1~tory. r· l'ri.l ~-,.1--:::i. P".11tf-d 
l ~17\. rh 7fi. § 10, L l '.17."i, ch )IJI, ; 7, 
rh ! :JtJ. ~ '.J 
•re "'Jhsrrt,rrn rd.r,1~raph beg1nn1ng "!f none 
,,f r.he n1• thor!, • • •' :is s•1bsec (3), and 
:11Jd1·,[ ,uli;tC i I 
T'".r '1'.•70 ~Il'>+-'nrlment deleted "then he 
Compiler''! Note; ruundf'd lu th+; nearest dollar and ::ihal!" 
Trd 1·_17-1 anit·ndnient 'ubq1tuled 'Jn1df(J" .:iftcr "1t sh.:ill" 1n the Gr::il sentence of subsec. 
for "rnult.r.i1ed" 1n ,.,,,1,,J I) 11111 rcrk~r~natl'd 1 \1 :ind .i.ddcd lhc I.isl sentence to subscc (1l 
